Oh, and if there's any doubt in your mind over Air Chance's operating practices, read the real story about the Concorde crash, including all the bits the BEA's investigation neglected to consider relevant.
Aircraft overweight (beyond airframe structural limits let alone operational limits for the conditions!) and loaded with a dangerously nose-light CofG.
Then they overfilled the fuel tanks, defeating the cut-off mechanisms that prevent over-filling.
They stripped down the undercarriage but had bits left over after they'd finished reassembling it. Their response to this was "oh, well".
The flight crew shut down an engine that was producing useful thrust while the aircraft was struggling to maintain a climb and well below the minimum height at which the operating procedures allow them to do so.
After the aircraft returned to service they nearly lost another one by flying across the atlantic with fuel pouring through a windmilling failed engine and only noticed when the red lights started coming on.
None of this made any difference to the outcome* so that's OK, then. but, if you operate aircraft like this it will bite you in the @rse eventually, and I 'ain't going to be onboard when it does.
* except that if the aircraft's takeoff performance had't been hobbled by the extra weight and faulty undercarriage it would have lifted off
before the bit of debris on the runway that did for it.